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THE TREATY-MAKING PROCESS UNDER THE 1988
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION OF BRAZIL
GUIDO F.S. SOARES*

I.

INTRODUCTION

The National Constituent Assembly adopted the present Federal
Constitution of Brazil. The Assembly formed itself out of the National
Congress into the supreme body of the nation. In fact, the National Congress stopped functioning as a legislative body, and dedicated itself for
nearly a year to the writing of the Brazilian Federal Constitution. The
President of the National Constituent Assembly solemnly promulgated
the 1988 Federal Constitution in Brasilia on October 5, 1988.
Unlike many other Federal Constitutions of Brazil, the 1988 Constitution was prepared, debated, and adopted without the preparation of a
bill from the Executive Branch of the Government. Instead, it resulted
from the legislative activities of the commissions and subcommissions of
the National Constituent Assembly. According to Professor Manoel
Gongalves Ferriera Filho, it is natural that its text
repeated itself, and is contradictory. It is evident that in twenty-four
subcommissions, and through eight commissions, one could not avoid
that different views would prevail on similar or related points, because
of existing ideological divisions. Furthermore, the subcommissions
and commissions went far beyond their powers, invading the spheres
of others, trying to promote their own views.'
The final version of the 1988 Federal Constitution of Brazil is a very
complex document, full of self-executing dispositions and a large number
of programmatic dispositions. In the constitutionalists' eyes, it exhibits
an enormous lack of good legal technique.
In this analysis of the 1988 Federal Constitution, we are going to use
the English version, which was prepared by the Legislation Committee of
the American Chamber of Commerce for Brazil-Sdo Paulo, in cooperation with the Association Alumni of Sdo Paulo. Also, in this paper, we
* Professor of International Law, Faculty of Law, University of Sio Paulo. J.D. (University
of Sio Paulo), M.C.L. (University of Illinois, USA), Ph.D. (Political Science, International Relations, P. Catholic University of Sio Paulo), Post-Doctoral Degree in International Law (University
of Sio Paulo).
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will translate into English texts originally written in Portuguese. Texts
written originally in English shall be so indicated.
This paper will not consider the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, despite the great importance it is given in Brazil, because it has
not yet been ratified by Brazil. Brazil signed and ratified the Havana
Convention on Treaties of 1928, but scholars, judges and legislators ignored it.
II.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE BRAZILIAN FEDERATION

With respect to foreign affairs, the 1988 Federal Constitution
presents some difference from previous constitutions. For example, some
articles, sections and subsections have been removed, while others have
been added. These changes are not always clear, nor are they necessarily
tied to a change in policy. One change in policy in constitutional matters
is reflected in article 4:
Article 4 - The international relations of the Federative Republic
of Brazil are governed by the following principles:
I. national independence;
II. prevalence of human rights;
III. self-determination of peoples;
IV. non-intervention;
V. equality among States;
VI. defense of peace;
2
VII.

pacific solution of conflicts;

VIII. repudiation of terrorism and racism;
IX. cooperation among peoples for the progress of mankind;
X. granting of political asylum.
Sole paragraph - The Federative Republic of Brazil shall seek
economic, political, social, and cultural integration of the peoples
of Latin America, in order to form a Latin-American community
of nations.
Another change in the general policy for foreign affairs is related to
the participation of the Brazilian Congress in the treaty-making process.
Article 49-I, intended to manifest control by the legislative branch of the
government in the treaty-making process, is awkwardly constructed.
Professors Celso Bastos and Ives Gandra Martins have noticed an important omission in the 1988 Federal Constitution: the omission of the place
of International Law as a source for internal law (a choice between monism or dualism). They have regretted that the 1988 Constitution had lost
2. The latter 1969 Constitution stated, "[i]nternational conflicts shall be settled through direct
negotiations, arbitration and other peaceful means, with the cooperation of international organizations in which Brazil participates."
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the occasion "to open a door to legal internationalism." '3
One relevant section of the 1988 Constitution is Title III, the Organization of the State. Chapter II of that section describes the federal units
of Brazil: the Republic, the States, the Municipalities, and the Federal
District. Article 21 describes the jurisdiction and the power of the
Republic:
Article 21 - It is incumbent upon the Republic:
I. to maintain relations with foreign States and participate in international organizations;
II. to declare war and make peace;
III. to warrant national defense;
IV. to allow, in the events set forth in a supplemental law, foreign
forces to cross the nation's territory or remain in it temporarily;
V. to decree state of siege, state of defense and federal intervention.
In addition to article 84-VIII (the President's powers in the treatymaking process), and article 49-I (Congress' exclusive power to approve
treaties), this study will analyze other provisions of the 1988 Constitution
relevant to international agreements:
a. Article 5, paragraph 2: The rights and guarantees established in
this Constitution do not preclude others arising out of the regime and
principles adopted by it, or out of internationaltreaties to which the
Federative Republic of Brazil is a party.
b. Article 102: The Federal Supreme Court shall be responsible,
mainly, for safeguarding the Constitution and it is incumbent upon it:
III. to adjudicate, at extraordinary appeal level 4 cases decided
in a sole or last instance, when the appealed decision:
b. declares the unconstitutionality of a treaty or a federal
law.
c. Article 105: It is incumbent upon the Superior Court of Justice:
III. to adjudicate, at special level, cases decided, in a sole or last
instance, by the Federal Regional Court or by the Courts of the
States, of the Federal District and Territories, when the appealed
decision:
a. is contrary to a treaty or federal law or denies the effectiveness thereof.
d. Article 109: It is incumbent upon the federal judges to process and
adjudicate:
III. cases based on a treaty or a contract of the Republic with a
foreign State or international organization.
e. Article 109: It is incumbent upon the federal judges to process and
adjudicate:
V.

crimes set forth in internationaltreatiesor conventions, when,

3. CELSO BASTOS & IVES GRANDRA MARTINS, 1 COMENTARIOS A CoNSTITUI Ao DO
SIL 452 (1988) (promulgada a 5 deoutubro de 1988).
4. This appeal is a judicial review measure similar to certiorari in the United States.
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prosecuting having commenced in Brazil, the result has taken
place or should have taken place abroad, or reciprocally.
f. Article 178, paragraph 1: The organization of international transportation shall comply with the agreements signed by the Republic
with due regard for the principle of reciprocity. [emphasis added]
The variety of denominations for international treaties is evident. This
lack of uniformity is still more striking when the treaty-making process is
analyzed.
Unlike the USA, in Brazil there is a clear division of the matters
that fall within the jurisdiction of the Republic, and those which fall
within the jurisdiction of the States. This division is express in the
Constitution:
Article 25, paragraph 1: To the States is reserved jurisdiction over the
matters not forbidden to them by this Constitution.
Brazil differs from the U.S. in this regard because, unlike the U.S., the
Brazilian Federation emerged from a unitarian State (the Empire of Brazil), and split into decentralized federal units. The essence of the federation, then, was a partition of a single unit. In the U.S., in contrast, the
sovereign states gave away parts of their jurisdiction in order to constitute a union of the States.
There is a twilight zone between international contracts and international treaties, where the Brazilian States and the Municipalities can exercise a power not expressly forbidden by the Constitution. For example,
the States and Municipalities can negotiate contracts with foreign entities, such as foreign states, international organizations, or private banks.
Because they are not treaties, and because their nature under the Constitution has not been challenged, these contracts do not fall within the
categories of the treaty-making process. However, the Constitution has a
special provision about this phenomenon:
Article 53: It is incumbent exclusively upon the Senate:
V. to authorize foreign transactions of a financial nature, of interest to the Republic, the States, the Federal District, the Territories, and the Municipalities.
Even when the States of Brazil have a strong interest in foreign relations with bordering countries, the entire relationship is conducted by the
government of the Republic. Such simple matters as transfrontier movements fall under federal jurisdiction. Four large international zones are
affected by this doctrine: the area of Amazon Cooperation Treaty; the
area of the Lagoa Mirim Treaty (Brazil-Uruguay); the area of the Plate
Bazin Treaty (Brazil, Uruguay, Paraguay, and Argentina); and the area
of the Itaipu Treaty (Brazil-Paraguay). Under the 1988 Constitution, the
States, Municipalities, Federal Territories, and Federal District do not
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have the international personality to enter into relationships with foreign
countries.
III.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND NATIONAL CONGRESS: AN OUTLINE

There are two special provisions in the 1988 Constitution related to
the treaty-making process:
Article 84: It is incumbent exclusively upon the President of the
Republic:
VII. to maintain relations with foreign States and to accredit
diplomatic representatives;
VIII. to enter into international treaties, conventions and acts,
according to the referendum of Congress.
Article 49: It is incumbent exclusively upon Congress:
I. to resolve conclusively on international acts, agreements or
treaties which involve charges or commitments against the national patrimony;
II. to authorize the President of the Republic to declare war, to
make peace, to allow foreign forces to go through the national
territory or to remain therein temporarily, except for the cases set
forth in a supplemental law.
The President of the Republic is exclusively responsible for a
number of activities, and the treaty-making process is just one of the activities within the President's domain. There are, however, no clear definitions of what activities by the President are contemplated.
Commentators on previous Constitutions often questioned which of the
President's acts related to foreign affairs must be approved by Congress:
whether bilateral or multilateral acts, or even unilateral acts that are directly related to foreign affairs. In the case of bilateral or multilateral
acts, the debates deal with the constitutionality of international executive
agreements. In the case of unilateral acts, the debates surround acts such
as termination, denunciation, or reformation of existing international
treaties which had already been approved by congressional referendum.
Under Article 84 of the 1988 Brazilian Federal Constitution, the
treaty-making process is fully entrusted to the Federal Government. In
the Presidentialist form of government, the Federal Government is represented in foreign and domestic affairs by the President. Thus, no other
branch of government may negotiate international agreements either
with foreign states or with international organizations. The President
has sole authority to engage the Federative Republic of Brazil in international relations. The President's authority arises not from the international practice related to federal power within federal systems, but
exclusively from the express text of the Constitution. Thus, if foreign
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tribunals recognize international personality for some of the States, or
even for some of the Municipalities, 5 such decisions would have no effect
on the internal constitutional definitions in Brazil, and would have even
less effect on judicial decisions internally.
The President's power related to the treaty-making process, then, is
conditioned on Congress's approval. This constitutional rule was inspired by the U.S. Constitution, which served as a model for the first
1891 Republican Constitution of Brazil. The 1824 Constitution of the
Brazilian Empire (which created a unitarian government with a parliamentarian regime) obliged the Emperor to submit to Parliament only
those treaties which involved a real change in the territory of the country
as a consequence of their application. Together with the Proclamation of
the Republic in 1889, Brazil has imported the U.S. model not only for its
Republic, but also for U.S. presidentialism, and for more complete control by the Congress in the treaty-making process. However, the treatymaking process has one major modification in Brazil: Congress's approval was not entrusted solely to the Senate, but to both Houses of the
Legislative Branch of Government. Thus, international agreements are
approved by the House of Representatives as well as the Senate, in separate sessions.
Nevertheless, the Senate has kept a certain precedence in relation to
the House of Representatives in matters of foreign affairs. The Senate
authorizes foreign transactions of a financial nature relating to the Republic, the States, the Federal District, the Territories, and the Municipalities. 6 Further, it is exclusively incumbent upon the Senate:
a) to give its prior approval, by secret ballot, after closed hearing, on
the selection of the leaders of diplomatic missions (Article 52-IV) ;
b) to provide for the aggregate limits and conditions for foreign and
domestic credit transactions of the Republic, the States, the Federal
District and the Municipalities, of their autonomous government entities and other entities controlled by the Federal Government (Article
52-VII);
c) To provide for the limits and conditions for the Republic to render
its guarantee in foreign and domestic credit transactions (Article 52VIII).

5. In terms of recognition of immunities to jurisdiction of certain States of the Brazilian Federation, there are some decisions of foreign tribunals which have given them certain qualities that in
the Brazilian law only the Republic should have. See GUIDO F.S. SOAREs, DAs IMUNIDADES DE
JURISDIl.AO E DE EXECUg iO (1982).

6. See Article 52-V.
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THE PROCEDURE OF NATIONAL CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL

The procedure for congressional approval for a treaty is similar to
the procedure for approval of federal statutory law. Once the President
concludes negotiation of the treaty, the text of the treaty is sent to the
House of Representatives in the form of an Executive Message. After the
House of Representatives approves the treaty, the text is sent to the Senate. If the House of Representatives fails to approve the treaty, the legislative process is ended, and there is nothing to be sent on to the Senate.
Approval by the Senate takes the form of a Legislative Decree, which is
issued by the President of the Senate, and is published in the Diario
Oficial do Congresso Nacional, the official publication for Congress's formal acts.
Legislative Decrees are considered to be the final evidence of the
National Congress's will during the treaty-making process. Any reservations or interpretations of approved treaties used to appear on the Legislative Decrees. The quorum required for adoption of a treaty is required
for approval of simple statutes: an absolute majority of the total members
of the Representatives and Senators, with a positive vote of the absolute
majority of the members present at the session.
According to Professor A.F. Rezek, Justice and former Minister of
Foreign Affairs of Brazil:
The use of the Legislative Decree as a device for Congress's approval
of treaties represents a more adequate technique than that of a formal
statutory law at present in use in France and used in former times in
Brazil. It makes no sense that this kind of an act of approval, which
reflects the Congress's position with absolute purity, should be subject
to the sanction of the President of the Republic, and consequently,
it
7
could give occasion to an unusual possibility of a veto.
According to a highly respected Brazilian scholar, Pontes de
Miranda:
Legislative decrees are the statutory laws which the Constitution
doesn't require their sending back to the President of the Republic for
sanction (promulgation and veto) (Commentarios i Constituigo de
67, III, pg. 139). 8

Unlike other countries, in Brazil there is no need for a special statutory law to bring an international treaty into force. Nonetheless, it is
customary to put these congressionally approved treaties into effect by
way of a President's Decree of Promulgation. International agreements
7. Jost FRANCISCO REZEK, DIRErrO Dos TRATADOS 332 (1984).
8. MANOEL GON4;LAVES FERREIRA FILHo, 2 COMENTARIOS A CONSTITUIW4AO FEDERAL,
EMENDA CONSTITUCI6NAL NR.1 DE 17 DE OUTUBRO DE 1969 15 (1974).
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which do not require congressional approval (such as Executive Agreements), and those which do not require a second manifestation of the
President (such as the International Labour Organization Conventions)
enter into force by mere publication, without the need for a President's
Decree of Promulgation. According to Professor Rezek:
...

the Decree of Promulgation does not constitute a constitutional

-requirement. It is the product of a practice as ancient as the Independence and the first treaty-making exercises of the Empire. It is just a
decree only because the Head of State's acts must bear such name. It
means an act of publicity of the treaty existence, and it is a rule of
present and imminent force. The organ of the official press publishes
them in order for the treaty-of which the complete text follows therewith-to be able to produce their effects at the appropriate moment. 9
It is important to note that even in the two critical moments of recent Brazilian history, when the National Congress had been abusively
removed from national life, 10 treaties were approved by a simple decree
of the President or by a "statutory decree". Again according to Professor Rezek:
in all those cases, a curious procedure of determination of the national
will was followed: the Executive power negotiated and signed the
agreement, then proceeded to its analysis and, if he wished to go further, a decree or a statutory decree was issued to approve it. .. then
having been supplied with his own approval, he ratified the treaty. "
In former Brazilian Constitutions, there was a perfect correspondence, in both words and concepts, between the President's power to
9. REZEK, supra note 7, at 385-86.
10. Twice in Brazilian constitutional history, statutory decrees (decretos-leis) have existed. The
first occasion was during the Estado Novo, a time of dictatorship, when President Getulio Vargas
closed the National Congress, from November 10, 1937 to February 2, 1946 (when the Constituent
Assembly was installed). During this period, the President issued statutory decrees on matters
where the participation of the National Congress would normally have been necessary, because there
was no National Congress. The second occasion was during the turbulent period which followed the
1964 revolution, with Institutional Acts 2 and 4. Because there was not a Federal Constitution
approved by the people in effect during this period, the President was authorized to issue statutory
decrees on matters of national security and public expenditures. This was during the so-called "extraordinary convocation" of the Congress, from December 12, 1966 to January 24, 1967. These
exceptional periods are reflected in the constitutional dispositions in 1967 (Art.58) and in 1969 (the
Federal Constitution of 1969, Art.55):
Art.55 - In urgent and relevant cases, and unless there is no increase in expenditure, the
President of the Republic may issue statutory decrees on the following matters:
I- national security:
II- public finance, including tax law:
III- creation of public offices and their compensation.
Paragraph 1.- The text of the statutory decree shall enter immediately into force, The
National Congress shall approve it or reject it, within 60 days, and it shall not be amended.
If within this period there is no deliberation, the text shall be considered as approved.
Paragraph 2. -The rejection of a statutory decree shall not cause the nullity of the acts
which were done while it had been in force.
11. REZEK, supra note 7, at 332.
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enter into international treaties and the Congress's power to approve
them. In the new 1988 Federal Constitution, there are important differences between the President's power and Congress's power. Contrast
Article 84-VIII:
[Ilt is incumbent exclusively upon the President of the Republic... to
enter into international treaties, conventions and acts, ad referendum
of Congress.
with Article 49-I:
[I]t is incumbent exclusively upon Congress... to resolve conclusively
on international acts, agreements or treaties which involve charges or
commitments against the nationalpatrimony (emphasis added to the

change introduced in the 1988 Federal Constitution).
The introduction of these new qualifications on Article 49-I must be read
according to a broad and historical sense.
Brazilian scholars who interpreted previous Brazilian Constitutions
considered the use of synonymous words for "treaty" to be evidence of
the framers' intent that any type of international commitments (regardless of the formal denominations such as treaty, convention, agreement,
protocol, etc.), be submitted to Congress for approval. The late professor
Afonso Arinos and other professors of constitutional law asserted that
the existence of a list of synonymous words represented the constitutional legislator's intent that the words "treaties, conventions, and acts"
be read to include any form of international commitment. They argued
that the synonyms were used to avoid the argument that only international commitments expressly denominated "treaties" should be sent to
Congress for approval. However, Professor Arinos pointed out that the
problem had not been solved, because congressional approval could still
be circumvented by using still another synonym that is not on the list,
under some interpretations of the clause.
The same argument can be used in regard to the new language of
Article 49-I. The inclusion of the expression "which involve charges or
commitments against the national patrimony" side by side with "international acts, agreements, or treaties" can be read in two ways-either as a
limitation of the President's power in treaty-making, or a limitation of
Congress's power in treaty-making. Furthermore, one could read that
only treaties (under any denomination) which involve charges or commitments against the national patrimony should be sent to Congress for
approval!
V.

EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS AND THE BRAZILIAN PRACTICE

The question of qualifications of the international commitments in-
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volved in the treaty-making process represents an important issue, especially when examining the validity of Executive Agreements under the
Brazilian Constitution. This issue has been discussed with a certain passion by scholars, but up to this moment, the National Congress has not
directly challenged the President's activities in this area, nor has there
12
been a direct judicial decision on the matter.
As far as executive agreements are concerned, opinions are divided
in Brazil. Some important scholars' 3 argue that executive agreements
are unconstitutional because they are international commitments which
the President has not sent to Congress for approval. If, in fact, there are
no international acts exempt from Congress's approval, and the framers'
intent was not to create any exempt acts as evidenced by the list of synonyms, then the President has no reason not to send an international
agreement to Congress. After all, the intent of the Constitution is to
impose a heavy obligation on the President to work closely with Congress. And finally, the words of a statute are not useless, particularly
when that statute is the Federal Constitution. If such words were used
with a special meaning intended, they must be given that meaning. This
was the opinion of Professor Haroldo Valladio.
While the 1988 Constitution was being written, a book was published which gathered together the suggestions of professors of international law for the future Federal Constitution.' 4 One article' 5 in the
book summarized the opinions of Ambassador Hildebrado Accioly, Consultant of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Brazil, and one of the best
supporters of the constitutionality and legitimacy of executive agreements. The following is a translation of Professor Mello's summary of
Ambassador Accioly's opinions:
The group that has admitted the conclusion of executive agreements
12. I have personally been interested in this subject and have written an entry on Agreements,
Executive Agreements, and Gentlemen's Agreements in 5 ENCICLOPEDIA SARAIVA DO DIREITO
246-81 (1977). This entry was later republished in 73 REVISTA DE FACULDADE DE DIREITO DA
UNIVERIDADE DE SAO PAULO 283-331 (1977) and in 272 REVISTA FORENSE 57-76 (1980), both

with the title Acordos Adminisrativos e Sua Validade no Direito Brasileiro.
13. See, e.g., Afonso Arinos de Mello Franco, Poder Legislativo e PoliticaInternacionalin EsTUDOS DE DIREITO CONSTITUCIONAL, REVISTA FORENSE (Rio de Janeiro ed., 1957), and especially
the synthesis provided by Prof. Haroldo Valladfio in Aprovqeao de Ajustes Internacionaispelo Congresso Nacional Parecer in BOLETIM DA SOCIEDADE BRASILEIRA DE DIREITO INTERNACIONAL
(1950), and Parecerin BOLETIM DA SOCIEDADE BRASILEIRA DE DIREITO INTERNACIONAL 5-11

(1948).
14. The book was published under the coordination of Professor Jacob Dollinger. A NOVA
CONsTITUIrrAO E o DIRETO INTERNACIONAL: PROPOSTAS E SUGEST6ES (Jacob Dollinger ed.,

1987).
15. Celso de Albuquerque Mello, Constituiqdoe Relaqdes Internacionaisin A NOVA CONSTITUICAO, supra note 14.
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within the framework of the Constitution was headed by Hildebrando
Accioly. One can say that those who have defended such an idea have
been influenced by the American practice. We're going to make a
summary of this great internationalist's arguments. He has stated that
the Congress's approval would be dispensed with for the following
acts:
a) agreements about matters which fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Executive power;
b) those concluded by agents or officers who have jurisdiction
thereon, about questions of local interest or of limited importance;
c) those which deal with simple interpretation of the clauses of a
treaty already in force;
d) those which are the logical or necessary consequences of
some treaty in force and which are complementary to it;
e) those modus vivendi when they aim at only leaving "things in
the state in which they are or to establish simply a basis for future
negotiations" including extradition declarations "and engagements for the prolongation of a treaty, before it expires." Foreign
policy is the exclusive jurisdiction of the President of the Republic. Executive agreements would thus be concluded on matters
which fall upon his power, which would be a matter of simple
verification, due to the fact that the Federal Constitution indicates
what is exclusively incumbent upon each branch of Government.
In Brazil a custom would exist allowing the validity of executive
agreements. 16
In 1977, we wrote in our entry in the Enciclopedia Saraiva de
Direito (in translation):
A meaningful example which constitutes an evidence of the need and
of the usefulness of executive agreements, is given by the examination
of what has been done in the field of the bilateral relations Brazil/F.R.
of Germany, concerning the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. It is clear
that there is an enormous complexity in installing in Brazil, in cooperation with Federal Germany, an entire nuclear industrial complex,
which ranges from the extraction of minerals up to the activities related to the recycling of irradiated fuels (obtaining Plutonium, the fuel
for breeder reactors), including the plants of fuel preparation, of reactor buildings and all associated legal problems, such as reciprocal duties, financing... the difficult questions of safeguards and the physical
protection of nuclear devices held in common, all these, under International Atomic Energy Agency surveillance. Such complexity cannot
be comprehended in a single treaty having only eleven articles, as that
which was signed between both countries in Bonn, on June 27, 1975,
"Agreement on the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy"; this is a treaty
in due form, because it was approved by the Brazilian Congress (Legislative Decree 85 of October 20, 1975) and was duly promulgated by
the President (Decree 76.695 of December 2, 1975). This treaty was
signed by Brazil's Minister of Foreign Affairs and by the F.R. of Ger16. Id. at 23-24.
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many's Chancellor, then, the organs of the Executive Branch of Government which are responsible for the treaty-making process ...
However, the following day, the Minister of Mines and Energy of Brazil would sign a "Protocol on Cooperation in the Field of Peaceful
Uses of Nuclear Energy," also in Bonn, due to the fact that the Brazilian Minister of Mines and Energy had joined the official Brazilian delegation on the official visit to that country. In parallel, in Brazil, at the
same day of both signatures, the Vice-Leader of the Government
before the Brazilian Senate read and explained both agreements before
the Senate, and the same would be repeated before the House of Representatives of Brazil. Nevertheless, later on, only the Agreement concluded between the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the F.R. of
Germany Chancellor would be sent to the National Congress for referendum; the Protocol would not be sent and, by the way, the Members
of the National Congress, who would be the immediately interested
people in fighting for their own constitutional prerogatives, would not
object to such an omission. This circumstance allows one to suppose
that the National Congress had considered that the Protocol, being
tied to the Agreement on the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, not
only in its entry into force but also in its interpretation would dispense
with the Legislative Power's referendum, because the principal legal
document, the Agreement, had already been approved by the National
Congress. Other illustrative examples in the same field are the executive agreement on the Approval of a Special Convention between the
Nuclear Energy Nation Commission (CNEN) and the Jullich Center
for Nuclear Research Ltd. (Diario Oficial June 1, 1973) concluded by
an exchange of diplomatic notes, and the Agreement on the Approval
of an Addendum to the same Jullich Agreement of October 3, 1973
(Diario Oficial of November 27, 1973); such commitments are consequences of the execution of the General Agreement in the Field of Scientific Research and Technological Development, of July 9, 1969,
which was previously approved by the Statutory Decree 681 of July 15,
1969, and promulgated by the Decree 65.130 of September 15, 1969
(Diario Oficial of September 17, 1969). The executive agreement for
the approval of the Convention between the CNEN (an autonomous
federal entity) and the Jullich Center (a non-governmental German entity) was not sent to the National Congress, but it does appear in the
National Congress Annals, because of a Senator's speech, who was a
little deceived by the nonparticipation of the National Congress in
such proceedings.
From an examination of these agreements one can conclude that
there is an implied understanding between the executive and legislative
branches of government. A specific agreement which completes a
more general one can take the form of an executive agreement, but
only if the more general one was previously approved by the National
Congress. The National Congress had been silent in the CNEN/Jullich case and in the case of the Brazil/Germany nuclear agreement, as
well as with respect to the Brazil/Israel Nuclear Agreement of 1966.
The Brazil/Israel agreement had "entered into force at the date of its
signature, due to the fact that it is a Supplementary Agreement to the
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Basic Agreement on Technical Cooperation between Brazil and Israel,
7
promulgated in 1964, after the National Congress's referendum."'
Professor Rezek 8 has noted that the classification of treaties based
on their need for congressional approval is a subjective concept related to
the internal constitutional rules of each party. For example, the Brazil/
USA Military Agreement of March 15, 1952 was an executive agreement
on the American side, but required congressional approval on the Brazilian side prior to its ratification. Article XII of that agreement specifies
that the agreement enters into force at the moment the Brazilian government should have notified the U.S. government about the Brazilian
ratification.' 9
All of this leads to one clear conclusion: legally binding executive
agreements exist without congressional approval. Whether one believes
that these agreements are binding because of constitutional custom (despite the fact that Brazilian scholars do not admit the existence of extra
legem custom in constitutional matters) or because of the exclusive policy making power of the President in matters of foreign affairs, one cannot conclude that they are unconstitutional without also concluding that
all foreign relations acts of the President have been unconstitutional since
the beginning of independent life of the country! Furthermore, until recently the legislative branch of government has not taken any direct action against the President for his failure to send international agreements
to Congress for approval, and a proceeding for impeachment could be
considered in such circumstances. Nor has there been a direct judicial
decision nullifying a treaty on the grounds that it lacked the constitutional prerequisites for entering into force.
The Federal Supreme Court of Brazil has issued binding precedent
about the extent of congressional control of executive agreements under
the Constitution and these decisions must be followed by inferior tribunals and judges in future cases. These decisions have dealt with the collateral subject of the relationship between international treaties in force
in Brazil and internal prior or supervening domestic federal statutes.
Nevertheless, they can indirectly guide interpreters of the treaty-making
process under the Brazilian Federal Constitution. The Federal Supreme
Court examined the question of the compatibility between the 1931 Geneva Convention on Uniform Law of Checks and two Brazilian statutes,
Public Law 2044 of 1908 and Public Law 2951 of 1912 in the Certiorari
17. At p. 272.
18. REZEK, supra note 7, at 333.
19. Id.
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RE 71.154 of 1971 (RTJ 58/70). The court decided that congressional
approval of a treaty was sufficient to transform it into a domestic statute,
without need of a special statute of approval or incorporation. The court
also decided that definitive approval of a treaty by the National Congress
revokes contradictory internal domestic statutes, and that the treaty supersedes any previous rule of law. In another certiorari RE 80.004 of
1977 (RTJ 83/809), the court examined the compatibility of the 1930
Geneva Convention of Uniform Law of Bill of Exchanges and Promissory Notes and the subsequent Brazilian statute, Statutory Decree 426 of
January 1, 1969. The court decided that an international treaty can be
superseded only by an internal federal statute because a treaty and a statute are on the same hierarchical level, and both can be superseded by the
Federal Constitution. In a concurring opinion, Justice Leitdo de Abreu
stated that this is not the case for the application of the lex posterior
revogat priori rule, but he added,
... a posterior statute in such a case, does not revoke the treaty, in the
technical sense, but it suspends its application. The difference rests on
the fact that, if a statute had revoked the treaty, this treaty should not
be applied again, in that part which was revoked. But, in my mind, as
the statute does not revoke the treaty, but while in force, it simply
suspends the treaty dispositions which are incompatible with it, the
treaty shall be applied again, if the statute which had hindered the
application of the treaty dispositions, is revoked in its turn.20
VI.

UNDERSTANDINGS AND DECLARATIONS
ATTACHED TO TREATIES

No rule in Brazilian constitutional law requires that a treaty must be
approved as a whole. According to Professor Rezek, if a treaty allows
the presentation of reservations, or if it does not prohibit them,
the National Congress has the power to approve it with restrictions which the Government, at the moment of its ratification, will transmit
as reservations - as well as the power to approve it with declarations
concerning the disapproval of reservations made to it at the moment
of
its signature - and which may be confirmed at its ratification 2'
In his study22 Professor Antonio Paulo Cachapuz de Medeiros notes
the possible results of congressional examination of international treaties:
20. RTJ 83/836.
21. Jost FRANCISCO
(1989).
22. ANTONIO PAULO
TERNACIONAIS (1983).
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a) their rejection; b) their partial approval; c) their approval with
amendments.
Congressional rejection of an international treaty is a rare phenomenon in Brazil. One example is the rejection of the ILO Convention 90 on
industry night work of minors, adopted at the San Francisco Session of
the International Labor Organization General Conference of 1948. The
House of Representatives voted to reject the Convention on the grounds
that there was a conflict between the Convention and the Brazilian Consolidation of Labor Laws, which forbids night work for children under
18 years of age. Thus, the National Congress voted to reject the ILO
Convention (Legislative Decree 20 of April 30, 1965).
Professor Cachapuz de Medeiros's examples of partially approved
treaties show exclusions from lists of items contained in the treaty. Examples of exclusions are ILO Conventions 103 and 106 (exclusion of certain categories of workers not allowed to have the special protection
afforded by such Conventions) and the GATT negotiations for the establishment of a new III List (suppression of a series of Brazilian products).
The National Congress partially approved three other international
agreements, but the restrictions made by Congress were motivated by
suggestions by the President himself. These agreements are the Convention for the Repression of Illicit Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation
(Legislative Decree 33 of June 15, 1972), the Convention on the Protection of Cultural and Natural World Patrimony (Legislative Decree 75 of
June 30, 1977), and the Ibero-American Agreement on Social Security
(Legislative Decree 130 of December 2, 1980).
The congressional approval of the Brazil-USA Agreement on Guarantee of Investments signed in Washington, DC on February 6, 1965
deserves some attention. The National Congress rejected parts of the
text based solely on political grounds and on the initiative of members of
Congress. Article VI, paragraph 3, in its official version states,
There shall be excluded from the negotiations and the arbitral procedures herein contemplated, matters which remain exclusively within
the internal jurisdiction of a sovereign State. It is accordingly understood that claims arising out of the expropriation of property of private
foreign investors do not present questions of Public International Law,
unless and until the judicial process of the recipient country has been
exhausted and there exists a denial ofjustice, as those terms are defined
in Public Internacional Law. The monetary amount of any claim submitted for negotiation or arbitration in accordance with the provisions
of this Agreement shall not exceed the amount of compensation paid
under guaranties issued in accordance with this agreement with respect
to the investment involved in the claim.
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Senator Afonso Arinos, then a famous Professor of Constitutional
23
Law in Brazil, presented the following objections to article VI, par.3:
1) its language is not precise and it is insufficient, when it deals with
the basic point of denial of justice, as there is not in Public International Law a generally accepted form for defining such an expression.
What exists is a direct conflict between two conceptions of this legal
formulation, the one that prevails in the countries receiving capital
(which maintains that the denial is verified when the State does not
offer a secure judicial protection to foreigners) and the other that is
predominant in the investor's countries (which maintains that despite
the assurance of formal judicial protection, this can be put into operation in an unjust manner toward foreigners).
Paragraph 3 of article VI of the Agreement states the subjects
which do not belong to International Law, but which fall under the
internal jurisdiction of Brazil, and which may be brought before international arbitration in the case of denial of justice, but if Governments
may consider a denial of justice to exist in cases of an unjust judicial
decision, even if issued according to the internal law, then, it follows
that a judicial decision issued by the tribunals of Brazil, according to
the Brazilian law, might be ex post facto submitted to an international
jurisdiction, which is repulsive to our constitutional organization.
2) The Senate, following the constitutional commandment cannot vote for a treaty which may be expressly or implicitly, but in
whatever hypothesis, undoubtedly unconstitutional. And the hypothesis, of having access to arbitration on claims which do not constitute
points of International Law, would make vulnerable many articles of
the Federal Constitution.
Finally, after a public hearing with the Minister of Foreign Affairs,
the Agreement was approved with the following proviso:
DENIAL OF JUSTICE according to article VI, paragraph 3, must be un-

derstood as the inexistence of tribunals or of normal means of access to
the Judiciary; the refusal to adjudicate by the authority having jurisdiction to; the unjustifiable delay of any judicial decision, following a
violation of an internal procedural rule.
This proviso can be deemed a true congressional interpretation of
the Brazil/USA Agreement of Investment Guarantee. Since it makes no
sense to define "denial of justice" internally, the effects must be produced
on international fora or in international negotiations. Therefore, the congressional proviso affects the international reciprocal relationship between Brazil and the USA in terms of protection of foreign investments.
VII.

CONGRESSIONAL AMENDMENTS TO INTERNATIONAL TREATIES

The third way the National Congress affects international treaties is
23. Id. at 152.
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by approval of treaties with amendments, where the amendments are
proposed by the National Congress itself. Relevant precedent in Brazilian law is the case of the Brazil/Czechoslovakia Agreement on Trade
and Payments of June 24,1960. When the National Congress reviewed
this agreement, some members opposed the establishment of a Mixed
Commission which would have the power to review annually a list of
items annexed to the agreement. There was also opposition to the existence of the list itself. Consequently, the National Congress issued its approval under the condition that the following article be included:
"Alterations in the list of items concerning Brazilian products... always
including Brazilian basic materials which are relevant to the development of the national economy, shall be valid only after their approval by
the National Congress, in the form required by the Constitution of the
Republic of Brazil." The same Legislative Decree included an order to
suppress "minerals of manganese" from the list of items to be exchanged.
Professor H. Valladfio, then the Legal Advisor of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of Brazil, delivered a legal opinion.
...there is nothing in the Federal Constitution which prevents the
National Congress ...

to amend a treaty or a convention ...

such

amendments represent reservations which may be brought to the
knowledge of the other Contracting Party, at the moment of the ratification.., and, if they are accepted, they will become part of the treaty,
definitely, and they will enter into force without the need of a new
examination by the Legislative Branch of Government of Brazil.
The Czechoslovakian government was then consulted about the
modifications in the agreement and finally gave its approval in an exchange of diplomatic notes in Prague on September 18, 1962. Subsequently, the President of Brazil promulgated the agreement on April 26,
1961 by Decree 51.951. The decree expressly mentioned the attachment
of conditions introduced by the National Congress. This is a good illustration of the Brazilian Congress's practice of attaching amendments and
provisos to international treaties. The other contracting party must
agree to the modifications, and the modifications must be compatible
with the treaty.
In the area of foreign relations the National Congress may not force
the President to perform acts which are constitutionally reserved to the
President's exclusive power and jurisdiction. Most believe that if the National Congress disagrees with a certain treaty in force, it has but one
way to act against it: by passing a statute against the treaty's legal dispositions. Because of the Federal Supreme Court's doctrine a later federal
statute supersedes a treaty internally. But there is no direct way for Con-
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gress to force the President to denounce a treaty because denouncement
and negotiation of international treaties are deemed as unilateral presidential acts not subject to congressional control.
Nevertheless, the President's power to terminate treaties which had
been approved by Congress was raised once in Brazilian practice in the
case of Brazil's withdrawal from the League of Nations and its subsequent denouncement of the 1919 Versailles Treaty. Following is the
legal opinion of Clovis Bevilacqua, a famous Brazilian scholar and former Legal Counselor of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs:
if there is in the treaty a clause providing for and regulating its denouncement, when the Congress approves the treaty, it approves the
way of how to terminate it: then, when such clause is put into practice,
the Executive Power but exercises a right that is already declared in
the text which has been approved by the Congress. The act of denouncement belongs to the Administration. The denouncement of a
treaty is a way of enforcing it,24when in one of its clauses the right to
terminate it is clearly defined.
Professor Rezek disagrees with Bevilacqua's opinion and states that
the National Congress has an indirect power to force the President to
terminate the treaty by passing a statute. For example, Public Law 2.416
of June 28, 1911 modified the method for extradition in Brazilian law
and ordered the President to denounce existing bilateral treaties on
extradition.

2

5

Thus, in Brazil, when the President is under the mandate of a federal statute, he must denounce a treaty. However, where Congress attempts to force the President to denounce a treaty for political reasons
Congress may not force the President to perform an act that is considered to be within his exclusive power and jurisdiction.
VIII.

CONCLUSIONS

The Brazilian system of treaty-making reflects the same complexities as the U.S. system. 26 In Brazil one can also say that the President is
entrusted to a "royal power" to enter into international treaties. However, it must be recognized that the President of Brazil has not abused
such "royal power."
Judicial review of the constitutionality of international treaties can
act as a check against the risk of abuse. The constitutionality of interna24. CL6vIs BEVILAQUA, PARACERES II 343 (Rio de Janeiro 1926).
25. REZEK, supra note 7, at 503.
26. See Louis Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the Constitution, 66 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 284 (1987/
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tional treaties can be decided either by a single judge on a federal court
or via the certiorari, which is decided either by the Superior Court of
28
Justice 2 7 or by the Federal Supreme Court.

27. C.F. Art. 105, III(a), "when the appealed decision is contrary to the treaty or federal law or
denies the effectiveness thereof."
28. C.F. Art. 102, III(b), "when the appealed decision declares the unconstitutionality of a
treaty or a federal law."

